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RAY MARLIN CRAWFORD,

Plaintiff,

v.

CAVALIER HOMES OF ALABAMA, INC., a division of Cavalier Manufacturing, Inc., a/k/a CAVALIER HOMES, INC., RESULTS ORIENTED, INC. d/b/a ASSURED HOUSING, and GREEN TREE FINANCIAL SERVICING CORPORATION,

Defendants.

CIVIL ACTION FILE NO. 98 V 641

Victoria S. Nugent, Esq.

F. Paul Bland, Jr., Esq.

TRIAL LAWYERS FOR PUBLIC JUSTICE, P.C.

1717 Massachusetts Ave., N.W.

Suite 800

Washington, DC 20036

(202) 797-8600

April 23, 1999

TABLE OF CONTENTS

SUMMARY

FACTS

ARGUMENT

I. ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS THAT ARE UNCONSCIONABLE MAY NOT BE ENFORCED

II. THE ARBITRATION AGREEMENT BETWEEN MR. CRAWFORD AND THE DEFENDANTS IS UNCONSCIONABLE AND IS THUS UNENFORCEABLE.

A. A rapidly growing number of courts have found arbitration agreements unconscionable where they require claimants to pay substantial fees for the opportunity to be heard.

B. The arbitration agreement between Mr. Crawford and the defendants is unconscionable under Georgia law.

1. Georgia courts evaluate procedural and substantive elements of a contract in determining unconscionability.

2. Lack of clarity in its terms and an absence of meaningful choice in its acceptance make the agreement procedurally unconscionable.

3. The arbitration agreement requires a claimant to pay fees so burdensome as to foreclose access to a neutral forum and therefore is substantively unconscionable.

CONCLUSION

FEDERAL CASES:

Cole v. International Security Services, 105 F.3d 1465

Doctor's Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681

Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20

Horenstein v. Mortgage Market, Inc., No. 98-1104-AA

Martens v. Smith Barney, Inc., 181 F.R.D. 243

Rollins, Inc. v. Foster, 991 F.Supp. 1426

Shankle v. B-G Maintenance Management of Colorado, 163 F.3d 1230

Shankle v. B-G Maintenance Management of Colorado,

1997 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 11024

STATE CASES:

Arnold v. United Companies Lending Co., 1998 W.Va. LEXIS 220

Avery v. Aladdin Products, 128 Ga.App. 266, 196 S.E.2d 357

Brower v. Gateway 2000, 676 N.Y.S.2d 569

Fotomat Corp. of Fla. v. Chanda, 464 So.2d 626

Freeman v. Hubco Leasing, Inc., 253 Ga. 698, 324 S.E.2d 462

Gonzalez v. Hughes, 82 Cal.Rptr.2d 526

Graham v. Scissor-Tail, 623 P.2d 165

In Matter of Arbitration between Teleserve Systems Inc. and

MCI Telecommunications Corp., 659 N.Y.S.2d 659

Mullis v. Speight Seed Farms, Inc., 234 Ga.App. 27, 505 S.E.2d 818

Myers v. Terminex, 697 N.E.2d 277

NEC Technologies, Inc. v. Nelson, 267 Ga. 390, 478 S.E.2d 769

In re Oakwood Mobile Homes, Inc., 1999 Tex. LEXIS 14

Patterson v. ITT Consumer Financial Corp., 18 Cal.Rptr.2d 563

Sosa v. Paulos, 924 P.2d 357

Spence v. Omnibus Industries, 119 Cal.Rptr. 171

Williams v. Aetna Finance Co., 700 N.E.2d 859

Zepp v. Mayor & Council of Athens, 180 Ga.App. 72, 348 S.E.2d 673

FEDERAL STATUTES:

9 U.S.C. §2

MISCELLANEOUS:

American Arbitration Association's Commercial Arbitration Rules (1997)

Trial Lawyers for Public Justice ("TLPJ") is a national public interest law firm that specializes in precedent-setting and socially significant civil litigation and is dedicated to pursuing justice for the victims of corporate and governmental abuses. Litigating throughout the federal and state courts, TLPJ prosecutes cases designed to advance consumers' and victims' rights, environmental protection and safety, civil rights and civil liberties, occupational health and employees' rights, the preservation and improvement of the civil justice system, and the protection of the poor and the powerless.

Over the past year, TLPJ has been contacted by a large number of consumer attorneys around the nation who were faced with mandatory arbitration schemes that threatened to deprive their clients of their day in court. In each case, the attorney's consumer clients wished to pursue their claims through the civil justice system, and to have their cases heard by a jury of their peers, but the corporate defendant sought to force the consumers to submit these claims to an arbitrator. As a result of our investigations and research, TLPJ has become convinced that, in many cases, mandatory arbitration agreements deny consumers access to a neutral forum for the resolution of disputes.

Under the Federal Arbitration Act and decisional law interpreting the Act, courts may refuse to enforce arbitration agreements that violate state common law principles of equity that are generally applicable to contracts. By requiring the payment of hefty fees to purse a claim in arbitration, the arbitration agreement allegedly existing between Mr. Crawford and the defendants forecloses this plaintiff's access to a neutral forum for the resolution of his claim and is unconscionable. A rapidly growing body of law supports this conclusion: during the last two years, ten courts around the country -- including three circuits of the federal Court of Appeals -- have examined arbitration fees and held that arbitration should not be compelled where claimants are required to pay substantial fees to secure the opportunity to be heard. TLPJ therefore urges this Court to deny the defendants' motions to compel arbitration.

Ray Marlin Crawford purchased a Cavalier Homes mobile home costing more than $75,000 in 1997. While contemplating this purchase, Mr. Crawford made three trips to the Results Oriented lot to examine model homes and discuss the contours of the sales transaction: price, warranties and financing. He was assisted by a salesman, Michael Hamm, and a second man who he believes was the lot owner, Larry Iman. Mr. Hamm told Mr. Crawford that Cavalier Homes were well-manufactured and covered by warranty. The second man prepared the financial numbers and was aware that Mr. Crawford's income limited him to a monthly expenditure of $500. During these discussions, Mr. Crawford was never advised that should problems arise with his new mobile home, he would have to pay for an arbitration proceeding to enforce any remedies to which he was entitled.

After considering the information he had been given by the staff of Results Oriented, Mr. Crawford returned to the lot prepared to purchase a home. Don Gilbert, the manager, presented Mr. Crawford with a stack of papers approximately one inch thick, assuring him that they were standard documents for mobile home sales. Without advising Mr. Crawford to review the documents or disclosing that the documents contained terms previously not discussed, Gilbert quickly shepherded Mr. Crawford through the stack, requesting his signature and initials at various points.

Among these papers, Mr. Crawford unwittingly signed sales documents that included two mandatory arbitration provisions. The first appears as § 14 of the Retail Installment Contract and Security Agreement between Results Oriented, Green Tree and Mr. Crawford; the second appears as §10 of the Acknowledgment and Agreement between Cavalier Homes, Results Oriented and Mr. Crawford. Together, these provisions constitute Mr. Crawford's arbitration agreement with the defendants.

Under this arbitration agreement, Mr. Crawford must pay substantial fees - not disclosed in the sales documents - to pursue his claim.⁽²⁾ In addition to the $1250 filing fee to initiate an arbitration proceeding and a daily administrative fee of $150, he may be responsible for some or all of the arbitrator's fees, which may range between $100/hour and $1400/day according to the American Arbitration Association (AAA).⁽³⁾ And though this dispute has arisen between a commercial entity distributing its products in Georgia and a Georgia resident over a transaction that was negotiated and consummated in Georgia, the agreement specifies that the arbitration proceeding shall take place at the manufacturer's principal place of business. Acknowledgment and Agreement, §10. That location -- not disclosed in the arbitration provision -- is Addison, Alabama, which is more than three hours by car from Mr. Crawford's house in Carroll County. Thus the arbitration clause contemplates that Mr. Crawford may be obliged to incur costs for travel and accommodations in pursuing his claim through arbitration. The minimum total that Mr. Crawford would expect to pay to cover these fees and arbitrate his claim is $2000; he might be required to pay a great deal more; in contrast, the fee for filing this action in this Court is $65.

Results Oriented and Green Tree have reserved their rights to sue Mr. Crawford in court to enforce the monetary obligation securing the manufactured home or to foreclose on the manufactured home. Retail Installment Contract, § 14.

Mr. Crawford alleges that his mobile home is riddled with defects, the most significant of which is racking and torquing; as a result, the two halves of this prefabricated home cannot be properly assembled and the home cannot be leveled. After Mr. Crawford's repeated attempts to secure repairs through Cavalier Homes, Inc. and Results Oriented, he sued them and the lender, Green Tree Financial Services, in this Court for breach of contract and fraud. All three defendants have refused to answer Crawford's complaint and comply with his discovery requests, instead asking this Court to compel arbitration.

I. ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS THAT ARE UNCONSCIONABLE MAY NOT BE ENFORCED.

The Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) provides that a contractual agreement to arbitrate is valid, "save upon any grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract." 9 U.S.C. §2 (emphasis added). As the Supreme Court has stated, the purpose of the FAA is to "place arbitration agreements upon the same footing as other contracts." Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24 (1991). Fully consistent with the purpose and text of the FAA, arbitration agreements may be challenged and invalidated on any generally applicable contract principles.

Under state contract law principles, the validity of a contract may be challenged under several theories, including fraud, duress and unconscionability. The Supreme Court has expressly stated that these defenses are available to a party challenging an arbitration agreement. Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996) ( "generally applicable contract defenses, such as fraud, duress or unconscionability, may be applied to invalidate arbitration agreements without contravening [the Federal Arbitration Act]"); Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 33 ("courts should remain attuned to well-supported claims that the agreement to arbitrate resulted from the sort of fraud or overwhelming economic power that would provide grounds 'for the revocation of any contract'") (citation omitted).

Courts across the United States have refused to enforce arbitration agreements where they have found procedural or substantive unconscionability. Graham v. Scissor-Tail, 623 P.2d 165 (Cal. 1990) (holding unconscionable a contract of adhesion that designated presumptively-biased arbitrator to hear disputes); Gonzalez v. Hughes, 82 Cal Rptr. 2d 526 (Cal. App. 1999) (finding unconscionable an arbitration agreement that employee had no opportunity or ability to bargain for and that reserved access to the courts to employer while limiting employee to arbitration); Williams v. Aetna Finance Co., 700 N.E. 2d 859 (Ohio 1998) (finding that arbitration provision in consumer loan documents was unconscionable based upon the specific circumstances of the case), cert. denied, 1999 U.S. LEXIS 2366 (Apr. 5, 1999); Sosa v. Paulos, 924 P.2d 357 (Utah 1996) (finding that agreement patient was forced to sign minutes before surgery and that required claimant to pay defendant's arbitration fees if she prevailed but was awarded less than half the amount claimed was procedurally and substantively unconscionable); Arnold v. United Companies Lending Co., 1998 W. Va. LEXIS 220 (Supreme Court of W. Va., Dec. 11, 1998) (finding that agreement between national corporate lender and elderly, unsophisticated consumers that waived the consumers' right of access to the courts while the preserving the lender's right to use a judicial forum was unconscionable). See also In re Oakwood Mobile Homes, Inc.,1999 Tex. LEXIS 14 (Tex. Feb. 11, 1999) (recognizing unconscionability as grounds for invalidating an arbitration agreement, although plaintiffs failed to present evidence of unconscionability in their affidavits).

II. THE ARBITRATION AGREEMENT BETWEEN MR. CRAWFORD AND THE DEFENDANTS IS UNCONSCIONABLE AND IS THUS UNENFORCEABLE.

A. A rapidly growing number of courts have found arbitration agreements unconscionable where they require claimants to pay substantial fees for the opportunity to be heard.

In a wave of cases decided during the last two years, courts have closely examined the fees associated with arbitration; considering the practical effects of such fees, they have determined that where fees may discourage or prevent a party from bringing a claim, the agreement should not be enforced. Three opinions from the federal courts of appeal capture this reasoning.

In a thorough opinion resolving Cole v. Burns International Security Servs., the D.C. Circuit concluded that an employee could not be required to pay an arbitrator's fee - which the court estimated to range from $500 to $1000 or more, daily - to pursue his discrimination claims because the fees would discourage such an action and prevent him from vindicating his statutory rights.⁽⁴⁾ Cole v. Burns International Security Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1484 (D.C.Cir. 1997). Building on Cole, the Eleventh Circuit found unenforceable an arbitration clause that imposed a $2000 filing fee and potential responsibility for a portion of the arbitrator's fees, holding "costs of this magnitude [are] a legitimate basis for a conclusion that the clause does not comport with statutory policy [enabling people subjected to workplace discrimination to vindicate their rights]." Paladino v. Avnet, 134 F.3d 1054, 1062 (11th Cir. 1998) (Cox, J. concurring, for a majority of the court).

Most recently, in Shankle v. B-G Maintenance Management of Colorado, the Tenth Circuit examined an arbitration agreement governing an employment relationship. The court refused to compel arbitration where the claimant would be required to pay one-half of the arbitrator's fees -- an amount projected to total between $1875 and $5000 -- to resolve a discrimination claim against his employer. The court found that the agreement was unenforceable, "plac[ing] Mr. Shankle between the proverbial rock and a hard place - it prohibited use of the judicial forum, where a litigant is not required to pay for a judge's services, and the prohibitive cost substantially limited use of the arbitral forum." Shankle v. B-G Maintenance Management of Colorado, 163 F.3d 1230, 1235 (10th Cir. 1999).

Other courts have similarly found that substantial fees create a significant, if not impassable, roadblock that prevents consumers and workers from pursuing valid claims, and therefore are unconscionable. Horenstein v. Mortgage Market, Inc., No. 98-1104-AA (Or. 1999) (finding unenforceable arbitration agreement that required claimants to pay share of arbitrator's fees, regardless of possibility that cost of fees might be recovered in subsequent award) (a copy is attached as Exhibit 1); Rollins, Inc. v. Foster, 991 F. Supp. 1426, 1437 (M.D. Ala. 1998) (recognizing unconscionability as grounds for not enforcing an arbitration clause where costs of arbitration preclude consumer from pursuing a claim); Martens v. Smith Barney, Inc., 181 F.R.D. 243, 255-56 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (stating "arbitration agreement cannot impose financial burdens on plaintiff access to the arbitral forum" including steep filing fees and arbitrators' fees); Patterson v. ITT Consumer Financial Corp., 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 563, 566-67 (Cal. App. 1993) (refusing to compel arbitration of consumer claims where claimants were required to pay fees on grounds of unconscionability), review denied, 1993 Cal. LEXIS 4322 (Aug. 12, 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1176 (1994); Spence v. Omnibus Industries, 119 Cal. Rptr. 171, 173-73 (Cal. App. 1975) (refusing to require plaintiff seeking judicial resolution of $37,000 claim against building contractor to pay $720 filing fee to submit claim to arbitration); Brower v. Gateway 2000, 676 N.Y.S.2d 569, ___ (N.Y. App. 1998) (finding that "excessive cost factor [of approximately $5000] that is necessarily entailed" rendered provision requiring arbitration in an International Chamber of Commerce forum unconscionable); In Matter of Arbitration between Teleserve Systems Inc. and MCI Telecommunications Corp., 659 N.Y.S. 2d 659, 660, 664 (N.Y. App. 1997) (finding filing fee calculated on basis of one-half percent of the amount claimed - $204,000 fee in a $40 million anti-trust dispute - patently excessive, oppressive, burdensome and a bar to arbitration and therefore unconscionable in contract between sophisticated telecommunications firms); Myers v. Terminex, 697 N.E.2d 277, 280-81 (Ohio Ct. of Comm. Pleas 1998) (holding unconscionable arbitration clause that would require claimant to pay a filing fee of $2000 to pursue claim worth approximately $120,000).

B. The arbitration agreement between Mr. Crawford and the defendants is unconscionable under Georgia law.

1. Georgia courts evaluate procedural and substantive elements of a contract in determining unconscionability.

Unconscionable contracts are not enforced in Georgia. Freeman v. Hubco Leasing, Inc., 253 Ga. 698, 324 S.E.2d 462 (1985); Mullis v. Speight Seed Farms, Inc., 234 Ga. App. 27, 505 S.E. 2d 818 (1998), cert. denied, 1999 Ga. LEXIS 37 (Jan. 8, 1999). When seeking objective standards by which to evaluate unconscionability, the Georgia courts have recently used a two-pronged analysis favored by other jurisdictions, examining first the procedural elements of the contract and then the substantive components. NEC Technologies, Inc. v. Nelson, 267 Ga. 390, 391, 478 S.E. 2d 769, 771 (1996); Mullis, 234 Ga. App. at 29, 505 S.E. 2d at 820.

The procedural inquiry addresses the making of the contract and focuses on two factors: oppression and surprise. Mullis, 234 Ga. App. at 30, 505 S.E. 2d at 820. 'Oppression' may be inferred from unequal bargaining power that denies one party meaningful choice in the negotiations; 'surprise' exists where terms were hidden or obscured in a contract drafted by the party seeking to enforce the terms. Mullis, 234 Ga. App. at 30, 505 S.E. 2d at 820-21. Factors relevant to the procedural inquiry include "the age, education, intelligence, business acumen and experience of the parties, their relative bargaining power, the conspicuousness and comprehensibility of the contract language, the oppressiveness of the terms, and the presence or absence of a meaningful choice." NEC Technologies, Inc., 267 Ga. at 392, 478 S.E. 2d at 772.

The substantive inquiry examines the contract for terms that are one-sided -- either unreasonably favorable or overly harsh -- without justification. See Fotomat Corp. of Fla. v. Chanda, 464 So.2d 626, 629 (Fla. App. 1985); Arnold, 1998 W.Va. LEXIS 220 at*20. In evaluating substantive unconscionability, the court will consider "the commercial reasonableness of the contract terms, the allocation of risks between the parties, and similar public policy concerns." NEC Technologies, Inc., 267 Ga. at 392, 478 S.E. 2d at 772.

Defendants have overread the specific holdings of Avery v. Aladdin Products, 128 Ga. App. 266, 196 S.E. 2d 357 (1973) and Zepp v. Mayor & Council of Athens, 180 Ga. App. 72, 348 S.E. 2d 673 (1986), to stand for the proposition that any contract permitted under law cannot be unconscionable; the doctrine of unconscionability is distinct from the bar against illegal contracts. A determination of unconscionability requires an assessment of the parties and the substantive terms and procedural context of the agreement. As seen in Mullis, a court may conclude that contract terms reached by equally-matched parties are reasonable, yet find the same terms unconscionable when they bind parties of unequal strength. Mullis, 234 Ga. App. at 30, 505 S.E. 2d at 821. Similarly, terms that may reasonably cover a transaction involving one type of product, may be found unconscionable when applied to another product. Mullis, 234 Ga. App. at 29, 505 S.E. 2d at 820.

2. Lack of clarity in its terms and an absence of meaningful choice in its acceptance make the agreement procedurally unconscionable.

The arbitration fees that Mr. Crawford could be forced to pay were not disclosed in the arbitration provisions or any sales document. The arbitration provisions simply stated that disputes would be resolved in an arbitral, rather than judicial, forum, without indicating that Mr. Crawford would be responsible for substantial administrative and service fees in the arbitral forum that are significantly larger than the filing fees required to initiate an action in court.⁽⁵⁾ Mr. Crawford learned of the arbitration fees only after his attorney requested an arbitration package from the AAA. By failing to even mention that a party would have to bear the costs of arbitration, let alone hinting at the magnitude of such costs or providing the signatory with a copy of the AAA's fee schedule, defendants obscured the true meaning of the arbitration agreement. This lack of disclosure, seen in Myers v. Terminex, constitutes an impermissible surprise. Myers v. Terminex, 697 N.E. 2d at 281 ("[Plaintiff] was unaware of the undisclosed arbitration requirements. Such exorbitant filing fees [of $2000], "agreed to" unknowingly, would prevent a consumer of limited resources from having an impartial third party review his or her complaint against a business-savvy commercial entity. Therefore...the undisclosed filing fee requirement...is so one-sided as to oppress and unfairly surprise [the plaintiff].").

Mr. Crawford unknowingly accepted this arbitration agreement because he lacked a meaningful choice. He did not have information about the arbitration provisions that the defendants, who were also the drafters, had. And by his own description, Mr. Crawford is unsophisticated in business and legal matters. Crawford Aff. at 3. The sales documents were presented to Mr. Crawford as "standard documents" used for all mobile home sales and the arbitration clauses were pre-printed provisions not open to negotiation. Id. at 2. Even if he had fully understood the arbitration provisions, he was not in a position to bargain for more favorable terms on this point. A disparity in power between contracting parties characterized by these factors, as seen in Mullis, constitutes oppression. Mullis, 234 Ga. App. at 30, 505 S.E. 2d at 821.

3. The arbitration agreement requires a claimant to pay fees so burdensome as to foreclose access to a neutral forum and therefore is substantively unconscionable.

The Georgia courts have not specifically considered the contractual limit at issue here. The Supreme Court of Georgia, however, has held that a contract for the sale of goods that bars all remedies and avoids all damages is unconscionable. Freeman v. Hubco Leasing, Inc., 253 Ga. at 705-06, 324 S.E. 2d at 469-70 (allowing that parties to a consumer contract for the sale of goods covered by the Uniform Commercial Code may modify or limit remedies and the measure of damages in the event of breach, but finding unconscionable a contract provision that fails - facially or by operation -- to provide any remedy). Here, the arbitration agreement - by operation - bars all remedies available to Mr. Crawford, and therefore forces a result that is unconscionable under Georgia law.

Mr. Crawford cannot afford to pay these fees and continue to make payments on his home. Crawford Aff. at 3. Unless this arbitration agreement is invalidated, Mr. Crawford will have no opportunity to pursue his claims. Such a result - overly-harsh and not justified by corresponding concessions from the defendants, who have reserved their rights to sue Mr. Crawford in court should he fail to perform his contractual obligations - renders the agreement substantively unconscionable.

The facts of this case combine with Georgia law to justify the invalidation of the arbitration clause between Mr. Crawford and the defendants. As the Rollins court summarized:

When a party who is in...an inferior bargaining position...is compelled to assert her claims in arbitration, thus precluding a remedy in the less expensive public fora, and the costs of the arbitral forum render the party unable to pursue her claim, the clause is oppressive and one-sided and therefore unconscionable. To reach the opposite conclusion would permit more sophisticated business entities...to circumvent not only judicial, but also arbitral proceedings, thereby fully insulating themselves from complaints brought by lower-income consumers." Rollins, 991 F. Supp. 1426, 1437 (M.D. Ala. 1998).

Based on the foregoing, we urge this Court to deny defendants' motion to compel arbitration on grounds that the arbitration agreement between the parties was unconscionable.

Respectfully submitted,

_____________________________

Victoria S. Nugent

F. Paul Bland, Jr.

TRIAL LAWYERS FOR PUBLIC JUSTICE, P.C.

1717 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.

Suite 800

Washington, D.C. 20036

(202) 797-8600

1. The portion of this statement of facts describing the purchase of Mr. Crawford's mobile home is based upon the Crawford Affidavit filed with Plaintiff's Response to Defendants' Motions to Stay and Compel Arbitration.

2. The fees applicable to the arbitration scheme applying to this case are explained in the American Arbitration Association's Commercial Arbitration Rules at 26-29 (1997).

3. The AAA states the average arbitrator's daily fee as $700. Cole v. International Security Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1480, n.8 (D.C.Cir. 1997).

4. Ultimately, the court interpreted an ambiguous provision in the agreement to require the employer to pay all of the arbitrator's fees, and so found the agreement enforceable. Cole, 105 F.3d at 1485.

5. The fee for filing this action in the state court for Carroll County was $65. In determining that fees associated with arbitration are excessive, some courts have compared these fees with filing fees assessed by the courts. See Shankle v. B-G Maintenance Management of Colorado, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11024 at *9 (Colo. 1997) ($150 court filing compared to thousands of dollars in arbitration fees), aff'd 163 F.3d 1230 (10th Cir. 1999); Cole, 105 F.3d at 1484, n.12 (arbitration filing fee of $500 compared with district court filing fee of $120); Spence, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 172 ($50.50 superior court filing fee compared with $720 filing fee to initiate arbitration).