__________________________________________________
IN THE
Stephen G.
Lady,
Petitioner,
v.
Outboard Marine Corp.,
Respondents.
On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to
the
United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
Carter O. Bise
Logan & Bise
2211 24th Avenue
P.O. Drawer 4207
Gulfport, MS 39502-4207
228/864-3666
Arthur Bryant
Trial Lawyers for Public Justice, P.C.
One Kaiser Plaza, Suite 275
Oakland, CA 94612-3684
510/622-8150
Leslie A. Brueckner
(Counsel of Record)
Anne Bloom
Trial Lawyers for Public
Justice , P.C.
1717 Massachusetts Avenue,
NW, Suite 800
Washington, D.C. 20036
202/797-8600
QUESTION
PRESENTED
This
case involves the same issue raised by Lewis v. Brunswick Corp., No.
97-288 (October Term, 1997), cert.
granted, 522 U.S. 978 (1997), cert. dismissed, 523 U.S. 1113
(1998): whether common law tort claims
that a boat was defectively designed because it lacked a propeller guard are
preempted by federal law. In Lewis,
the United States submitted an amicus curiae brief stating the federal
government’s view that such claims are not preempted. Lewis, however, settled after oral argument, before any
decision was rendered. This case
presents the first opportunity for the Court to consider this preemption issue
since Lewis. The question
presented is:
Whether
the Federal Boat Safety Act of 1971, 46 U.S.C. §§ 4301-4311 (1988 & Supp.
1993), preempts state common law claims that a recreational motor boat was
defectively designed because it lacked a propeller guard when: (1) the Act
expressly provides that “[c]ompliance with this chapter or standards,
regulations, or orders prescribed under this chapter does not relieve a person
from liability at common law or under State law” (46 U.S.C. § 4311(g)); (2) the
U.S. Coast Guard has not adopted any standard or regulation with respect to propeller
guards; and (3) the United States has taken the position that common law
no-propeller-guard claims do not conflict with or otherwise frustrate any
federal statutory or regulatory purpose?
PARTIES TO THE
PROCEEDING
The
parties to the proceedings below were petitioner Steven G. Lady (as appellant) and respondent Outboard
Marine Corporation (“OMC”) (as appellee).
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
QUESTION
PRESENTED i
PARTIES TO THE
PROCEEDING................. ii
TABLE OF
AUTHORITIES v-vii
OPINIONS BELOW... 1
JURISDICTION.... 1
STATUTORY
PROVISIONS INVOLVED 1-2
STATEMENT OF
THE CASE 2
REASONS FOR
GRANTING THE WRIT 11
1. This Case Presents the Same Federal
Preemption Issue that the Court Considered in Lewis, But Could Not
Resolve Because Lewis Settled After Oral Argument... 11
2. There
is a Direct Split Between the Texas Supreme Court and Three Federal Courts of
Appeals,
Including the
Decision Below, as to Whether
No‑Propeller-Guard
Claims are Preempted by
the Boat Safety Act............ 12
3............ The
Decision Below Conflicts with Relevant Decisions of this Court........... 15
CONCLUSION.............. 26
TABLE OF
AUTHORITIES
Cases
Askew v.
American Waterways Operators, 411 U.S. 325
(1973)...... 23
Arkansas Elec. Co-Op v. Arkansas Pub. Serv.
Comm’n,
461
U.S.
375 (1983)........ 18
Carstensen v. Brunswick Corp., 49 F.3d 430 (8th
Cir.), cert.
denied,
516
U.S. 866 (1995)........ 15
Cipollone v.
Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504
(1992)...... 23
Freightliner
Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280
(1995) 16-18, 20
Geier v. Honda, 529 U.S.
1913, 120 S. Ct. 1913
(1999)...... 24
Goodyear Atomic Corp. v. Miller, 486 U.S. 174
(1988)........ 14
Hillsborough
County v. Automated Medical Laboratories, Inc.,
471
U.S. 707 (1985).. 13, 24
Huron Portland
Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440
(1960)...... 23
Kelly v. State of Washington, 302 U.S. 1
(1937)........ 23
Lewis v.
Brunswick Corp., 107 F.3d 1494 (11th Cir. 1997),
cert.
granted, 522 U.S. 978 (1997), cert. dismissed,
523
U.S. 1113 (1998) passim
Medtronic v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470
(1996).. 3, 21-24
Moore v. Brunswick Bowling & Billiards
Corp., 889
S.W.2d
246
(Tex.), cert. denied, 115 U.S. 664 (1994) 3, 13-15, 19
Paccar, Inc. v. NHTSA, 573 F.2d 632
(9th Cir.), cert. denied,
439
U.S. 862 (1978)... 16-17
Puerto Rico
Dep’t of Consumer Affairs v. Isla Petroleum Corp.,
485
U.S. 496 (1988).. 18, 20
United States
v. Locke,
529 U.S. 89, 120 S. Ct. 1135
(2000) 9, 22-23
Statutes and
Legislative Materials
Administrative
Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553
(1994).. 7, 20
Federal Boat Safety Act of 1971, 46
U.S.C. § 4301‑4311
(1988 & Supp. V. 1993).......... passim
National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety
Act of 1966, 15
U.S.C. §§ 1381 et seq. (1982)....... 16
S. Rep. No. 248, 92d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1971), reprinted in
1971 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1333........ 3-4
46 U.S.C. §
4302 (a)(1).. 3
46 U.S.C. §
4302 (b)...... 4
46 U.S.C. §
4302 (c)(2).. 4
46 U.S.C. §
4302 (c)(4).. 3
46 U.S.C. §
4306.. passim
46 U.S.C. § 4311(g)
.......... passim
Regulations
49 C.F.R. §
571.121(S3)(1993) 16-17, 20
60 Fed. Reg. 25,1919 (1995) ........ 7
61 Fed. Reg.
12,123 (1996)................... 7
62 Fed. Reg. 22,991 (1997)................... 7
62 Fed. Reg. 44,507 (1997)................... 7
64 Fed. Reg.
21,566 (1999)................... 7
Miscellaneous
Brief for the United States as Amicus
Curiae Supporting
Petitioners, Lewis v. Brunswick Corp., 522 U.S. 978 (1997)
(No. 97-288).......... passim
OPINIONS
BELOW
The
opinion of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit (App. 1‑39)
is reported at 228 F.3d 598 (5th Cir. 2000).
The opinion of the district court (App.
40‑ 47) was entered on May 7, 1999.
JURISDICTION
The
judgment of the court of appeals was entered on September 26, 2000. This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1254(1).
STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED
The
express “preemption clause” of the Federal Boat Safety Act of 1971, 46 U.S.C. §
4306 (1988), reads as follows:
Unless
permitted by the Secretary under section 4305 of this title, a State or
political subdivision of a State may not establish, continue in effect, or
enforce a law or regulation establishing a recreational vessel or associated
equipment performance or other safety standard or imposing a requirement for
associated equipment (except insofar as the State or political subdivision may,
in the absence of the Secretary's disapproval, regulate the carrying or use of
marine safety articles to meet uniquely hazardous conditions or circumstances
within the State) that is not identical to a regulation prescribed under
section 4302 of this title.
The
express “savings clause” of the Federal Boat Safety Act of 1971, 46 U.S.C. §
4311(g) (1988), reads as follows:
Compliance with
this chapter or standards, regulations, or orders prescribed under this chapter
does not relieve a person from liability at common law or under State law.
The
Coast Guard has not issued any regulations governing propeller guards on
recreational vessels. The agency did
consider whether to begin the process of developing a regulation requiring
propeller guards on recreational boats, but it decided not to do so. The Coast Guard’s decision not to take any
regulatory action with respect to such devices was not the subject of any
formal rulemaking or agency publication.
STATEMENT
OF THE CASE
This
case presents the question of whether a state common law claim that a boat
engine was defectively designed because it lacks a propeller guard is preempted
by the Federal Boat Safety Act of 1971, 46 U.S.C. § 4301‑4311 (1988 &
Supp. V. 1993) (“Boat Safety Act” or “Act”), and by a decision of the United
States Coast Guard not to begin developing a regulation that would require the
use of propeller guards on recreational motor boats. The Fifth Circuit held that such claims are impliedly preempted
by federal law, even though the Coast Guard has never regulated propeller
guards and even though the United States, in an amicus curiae brief
filed with this Court, took the position that no-propeller-guard claims like
petitioner’s are not preempted by federal law.
See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Petitioners, Lewis v. Brunswick Corp., 522 U.S. 978 (1997)
(No. 97-288). In so doing, the lower
court disregarded repeated teachings of this Court that the federal
government’s own view of the preemptive effect of agency regulations is
entitled to at least “substantial weight.” E.g., Medtronic v. Lohr, Inc., 518 U.S. 470, 496 (1996)
(majority opinion); id. at 505-07 (Breyer, J., concurring). The Fifth Circuit’s decision, which is in
direct conflict with the Texas Supreme Court’s holding in Moore v. Brunswick
Bowling & Billiards Corp., 889 S.W.2d 246 (Tex.), cert. denied,
115 U.S. 664 (1994), is the subject of this petition.
A. The Federal Statutory and Regulatory
Framework
1. The
Boat Safety Act.
The
Boat Safety Act was enacted to “improve boating safety by requiring
manufacturers to provide safer boats and boating equipment to the public
through compliance with safety standards to be promulgated by the Secretary of
the Department in which the Coast Guard is operating – presently the Secretary
of Transportation.” S. Rep. No. 248,
92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), reprinted in 1971 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1333,
1333. The Act provides that the
Secretary of Transportation “may prescribe regulations establishing minimum
safety standards for recreational vessels and associated equipment . . ..” 46 U.S.C. § 4302(a)(1). This rulemaking authority has been
transferred to the Commandant of the United States Coast Guard. See App. 9. The National Boating Safety Advisory Council (the “Advisory
Council”) is charged with assisting the Coast Guard in evaluating the need for
safety regulations. 46 U.S.C. §
4302(c)(4).
Under
the Act, the Coast Guard’s authority to issue minimum safety standards is
permissive, not mandatory. Id. See also S. Rep. No. 248, 92d Cong.,
1st Sess. (1971), reprinted in 1971 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1333,
1338. In addition, the Coast Guard is
prohibited from establishing regulations that would compel substantial
alterations of existing boats unless compliance with those regulations would
“avoid a substantial risk of personal injury to the public.” 46 U.S.C. § 4302(c)(2). The Act sets forth the procedures that the
Coast Guard must follow to prescribe such regulations, including the actual
publishing of a proposed safety standard and the express provision of a future
effective date after its initial publication.
See 46 U.S.C. § 4302(b).
Thus the Act
requires
certain actions by the [Coast Guard] in the development of safety standards . .
. In addition to the specific procedural requirements outlined in the [Act],
the [Coast Guard], in promulgating standards, is required to comply with the
formal rulemaking procedures in the Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C.
553).
S. Rep. No.
248, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), reprinted in 1971
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1333, 1340. Under this
scheme, any party adversely affected by a standard prescribed under the Act is
entitled to seek judicial review of the standard in accordance with the
Administrative Procedure Act. Id.
The
Boat Safety Act also contains two provisions addressing the effect of Coast Guard
regulations on state law. First,
Congress included in the legislation an express preemption clause providing, in
pertinent part, that:
Unless
permitted by the Secretary under section 4305 of this title, a State or
political subdivision of a State may not establish, continue in effect, or
enforce a law or regulation establishing a recreational vessel or associated
equipment performance or other safety standard or imposing a requirement for
associated equipment . . . that is not identical to a regulation
prescribed under section 4302 of this title.
46 U.S.C. §
4306. Second, Congress included an
express anti-preemption provision, or savings clause, that expressly preserves
all common law claims. It provides:
[c]ompliance
with this chapter or standards, regulations, or orders prescribed under this
chapter does not relieve a person from liability at common law or under State
law.
46 U.S.C. §
4311(g).
Together,
the preemption provision and the savings clause govern the preemptive effect of
federal regulations issued pursuant to the Boat Safety Act.
2.
The Coast Guard’s
Decision Not to Regulate Propeller Guards.
In 1988, at the Coast Guard’s
request, a subcommittee of the Advisory Council (the “Subcommittee”) was formed
to investigate the feasibility of requiring guards to prevent underwater
propeller accidents and to opine whether “the Coast Guard [should] move towards
a federal requirement for some form of propeller guard.” App.
11. In November 1989, based in
part on its conclusion that propeller guards “would not necessarily increase
boat safety” (App. 15), the Subcommittee recommended that “the U.S. Coast Guard
should take no regulatory action to require propeller guards.” App. 16.
This recommendation was then adopted by the Advisory Council and forwarded to the Coast Guard for its
consideration. App. 16.
On February 1, 1990, the Coast
Guard adopted the Advisory Council’s recommendation that it “take no regulatory
action to require propeller guards.”
App. 16. In a letter setting
forth the rationale underlying the agency’s decision not to begin the formal
regulatory process, Rear Admiral Robert T. Nelson explained the Coast Guard’s
position on propeller guards as follows:
The regulatory process is very structured and
stringent regarding justification.
Available propeller guard accident data do not support imposition of a
regulation requiring propeller guards on motorboats. Regulatory action is also limited by the many questions about
whether a universally acceptable propeller guard is available or technically
feasible in all modes of boat operation.
Additionally, the question of retrofitting millions of boats would
certainly be a major economic consideration.
App. 16-17.
Rear Admiral Nelson added, however, that the agency would “continue to
collect and analyze accident data for changes and trends . . . [and] review and
retain any information made available regarding development and testing of new
propeller guarding devices . . .” Id.
At no point did Rear Admiral Nelson’s letter – or anything else issued
by the Coast Guard – indicate that the agency had concluded that propeller
guards are dangerous, or that it intended to preempt common law claims relating
to a manufacturer’s failure to install propeller guards in its boats.
The Coast Guard’s 1990 decision
not to begin the process of developing a regulation to require propeller guards
was not the product of any formal rulemaking proceeding and did not result in
any regulatory action. The Coast Guard
Letter describing the agency’s decision not to regulate was not exposed to
public notice and comment and it was never published in the Federal Register. Thus, there was no attempt to conform to the
notice-and-comment rulemaking requirements of the Administrative Procedure
Act. See 5 U.S.C. § 553
(1994). To date, there is still no
federal regulation with respect to propeller guards, and their use is neither
mandated nor prohibited by federal law.[1]
B. The Proceedings Below
This
case arose out of a boating accident in Mississippi state waters in which the
petitioner, Steven G. Lady, was seriously injured by the propeller of a boat
designed and manufactured by respondent Outboard Marine Corporation (“OMC”). App. 2.
In a Mississippi state court complaint filed on March 11, 1998, Mr. Lady
alleged that the boat was defectively designed because it lacked a propeller
guard. Originally, the suit named as
defendants both the retail distributor of the boat (Neal Glaser Marine, Inc.)
and the boat manufacturer (OMC).
Shortly after filing, Neal Glaser Marine, Inc. was voluntarily dismissed
from the case, leaving only OMC as a defendant. OMC thereafter removed the case to the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Mississippi, Southern Division, based on
diversity jurisdiction. App. 3.
Shortly
after removal, the case was placed on inactive status pending resolution of Lewis
v. Brunswick Corp., 107 F.3d 1494 (11th Cir. 1997), cert. granted,
522 U.S. 978 (1998). That case, which
raised the issue of whether no-propeller-guard claims like petitioner’s are
preempted, was then pending before this Court. As noted above, however, Lewis settled after oral
argument but before any decision was rendered, and so this Court dismissed the
petition for certiorari. See
523 U.S. 1113 (1998). After Lewis
settled, OMC moved for summary judgment on the ground that Mr. Lady’s claim is
preempted by federal law. App. 3. The district court agreed, holding that the
Coast Guard’s decision not to require propeller guards expressly preempts
common law claims. While acknowledging
that the Coast Guard has never issued any regulations governing propeller
guards, the court reasoned that the agency’s decision not to require propeller
guards on all boats “takes on the character of a ruling that no such regulation
is appropriate, and precludes states from imposing liability based on the
absence of such guards . . ..” App. 44 (citations and internal quotation marks
omitted).
On
appeal, the Fifth Circuit rejected the district court’s express preemption
ruling, but nonetheless held that petitioner’s claims are impliedly preempted
by federal law. At the outset, the
court held that the case was not subject to the strong presumption against
federal preemption that traditionally has been applied to health and safety
issues – “matters that historically have been areas of state
jurisdiction.” App. 18 (quoting MacDonald
v. Monsanto Co., 27 F.3d 1021, 1023 (5th Cir. 1994)). Relying on this Court’s recent decision in United
States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 120 S. Ct.
1135 (2000), which held that the
presumption against preemption does not apply to cases involving international
maritime commerce, the Fifth Circuit reasoned that “a presumption against
preemption does not guide our analysis of whether federal law precludes Lady’s
common law tort claims against OMC.”
App. 21.
The
lower court then considered the questions of express and implied preemption under
the Boat Safety Act. Regarding the
former, the court concluded that the Act’s broadly-worded savings clause, which
provides that “compliance with this chapter . . . does not relieve a person
from liability at common law or under state law,” precludes any finding of
express preemption of common law claims.
App. 27. The Fifth Circuit went
on to hold, however, that petitioner’s claims are impliedly preempted by
federal law on the theory that a jury verdict finding OMC liable for not
installing a propeller guard would frustrate the Coast Guard’s regulatory
purposes. Despite its acknowledgment
that the Coast Guard has never issued any regulations governing propeller
guards (yet retains the authority to do so if it so chooses), the court found
that the agency’s regulatory inaction amounted to an affirmative decision to
preclude any common law claims seeking to hold a manufacturer liable for
failing to install propeller guards. In
the court’s view, “[a] damage award in favor of Lady would effectively require
boat manufacturers to install propeller guards, in direct contravention to the
Coast Guard’s policy against mandating such a device in favor of affording
manufacturers flexibility on the matter.”
App. 36 (citations
omitted).
Notwithstanding
its purported reliance on the agency’s “policy” as a basis for its implied
preemption ruling, the lower court chose to disregard the United States’ only
articulated view on the matter: the
anti-preemption position set forth in the Solicitor General’s amicus curiae brief
in Lewis, which argued that “[t]he Coast Guard’s conclusion in 1990 that
the available data did not justify the issuance of regulations concerning
propeller guards is not a basis for implied conflict preemption of
petitioners’ common law tort claims.”
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Petitioners at 26, Lewis v. Brunswick Corp., 522 U.S. 978 (1997) (No.
97-288) (emphasis added). The Lewis
brief emphasized that “[t]he Coast Guard has never formally determined that a
requirement [of propeller guards] would be contrary to the interests of boat
safety.” Id. The United States
further noted that,
[i]f it had
reached that conclusion, the Coast Guard may well have prohibited propeller
guards. The Coast Guard stated only
that the “available propeller guard accident data do not support imposition of
a regulation requiring propeller guards.”
Id. Given this fact, and the absence of any
federal regulation governing propeller guards, the United States concluded that
the petitioners’ claims did not in any way conflict with the federal regulatory
scheme. Id. at 25-30.
In
the face of these arguments, and despite its characterization of the implied
preemption issue as an “extremely close one” (App. 35), the Fifth Circuit ultimately held that the United States’
position in Lewis was not persuasive because “[t]he Solicitor General .
. . has not appeared before us in this case” and, in any event, “the weight we
would place on [the Lewis brief] would not be sufficient to overcome the
reasons supporting the application of implied preemption.” App.
38-39 n.22.
REASONS FOR
GRANTING THE WRIT
I. This
Case Presents the Same Federal Preemption Issue that the Court Considered in Lewis,
But Could Not Resolve Because Lewis Settled After Oral Argument.
This
case presents the same issue of federal preemption that was before the Court in
Lewis v. Brunswick Corp., 107 F.3d 1494 (11th Cir. 1997), cert. granted, 522 U.S. 978 (1997), cert. dismissed, 523
U.S. 1113 (1998): whether state common
law tort claims that a boat was defectively designed because it lacked a
propeller guard are preempted by federal law.
In Lewis, the United States submitted an amicus curiae brief
arguing that, because the Coast Guard never issued any regulations relating to
propeller guards, common law no-propeller-guard claims do not conflict with or
undermine any federal regulatory purpose.
Unfortunately, Lewis settled after oral argument, so no opinion
was ever rendered in the case. See
523 U.S. 1113 (1998). The lower courts
remain split on the issue, with one state supreme court (Texas) holding that
no-propeller-guard claims are not preempted and a host of federal courts
(including the Fifth Circuit in the decision below) holding just the opposite (see
infra at II).
The
decision below is the first opinion issued by a federal court of appeals in the
wake of Lewis. (No state supreme
court has since revisited the issue.) Although the Fifth Circuit agreed with petitioner that the Act
does not expressly preempt no-propeller-guard claims, it held that such claims
are impliedly preempted because the U.S. Coast Guard has considered taking, but
ultimately decided not to take, regulatory action requiring propeller
guards. In so doing, the lower court
emphasized that the case presents a “close and difficult issue” as to which the
lower courts remain deeply conflicted.
App. 6. Review is warranted
because this case presents the first opportunity since Lewis for this
Court to resolve this important issue of federal law.
II. There
is a Direct Split Between the Texas Supreme Court and Three Federal Courts
of Appeals, Including the Decision Below, as to Whether No‑Propeller-Guard
Claims are Preempted by the Boat Safety Act.
Review
is also warranted because there is a direct split between the Supreme Court of
Texas and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals (along with two other federal
circuit courts) as to whether a common law claim that a manufacturer is liable
for failing to equip its boats with propeller guards is preempted by the Boat
Safety Act. This split creates the
anomalous situation whereby the viability of no-propeller-guard claims in Texas
depends entirely on whether a case proceeds in state or federal court.
In
Moore, 889 S.W.2d 246, the Texas Supreme Court held that the Boat Safety
Act neither expressly nor impliedly preempts no‑propeller-guard
claims. The court emphasized the strong
presumption against federal preemption of state common law claims – a
presumption that “particularly obtains when, as in this case, state regulation
of health and safety matters is involved.”
Id. at 249 (citing Hillsborough County v. Automated Medical
Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 715 (1985)).
In light of this strong presumption against preemption, Moore
rejected the boat manufacturers’ claim that the reference to “law or
regulation” in the Boat Safety Act’s preemption provision encompasses – and
expressly preempts – common law claims.
889 S.W.2d at 250.
The
Texas Supreme Court also rejected the boat manufacturers’ argument that the
plaintiff’s no‑propeller-guard claims were impliedly preempted under the
Act. Id. at 251. On this point, the defendants argued
that “a jury award in this case will conflict with and undermine the goals of
the Act by creating a standard requiring propeller guards, in the face of the
Coast Guard’s determination that guards should not be mandated.” Id.
The Texas Supreme Court disagreed, stating, first, that the Coast
Guard’s decision not to commence rulemaking did not “reflect an intention to
foreclose state tort liability.” Id.
As
to the boat manufacturers’ claim that preemption must be implied because
permitting no‑propeller-guard claims would undermine Congress’ goal of
creating uniform safety regulations, the Texas Supreme Court stated: “the [Act’s] savings clause reflects that
Congress was willing to tolerate some tension between the concept that uniform
safety regulations should be established at the federal level and the concept
that a state may nevertheless award tort damages for unsafe products.” Id. at 252. This approach makes sense, in the Texas
Supreme Court’s view, because “the regulatory effect of damage awards is not
equivalent to that of positive enactments: a manufacturer who incurs tort
liability for failing to install propeller guards has a choice not available to
the regulated manufacturer – installing guards on future boats or taking no
action and bearing the liability as a cost of doing business.” Id. at 251 (citing Goodyear Atomic
Corp. v. Miller, 486 U.S. 174, 185‑86 (1988)).
The
decision below is squarely in conflict with Moore. Although the two courts agree that there is no express
preemption of common law claims under the Boat Safety Act (in light of the
Act’s savings clause), the Fifth Circuit split with Moore in holding
that no-propeller-guard claims are
impliedly preempted by the Coast Guard’s regulatory inaction. To reach this conclusion, the Fifth Circuit
began by abandoning a core proposition of law embraced in Moore: that
such claims are subject to a strong presumption against federal
preemption. See App. 18-21.
Having jettisoned the presumption against preemption, the lower court
went on to conclude – again directly contrary to the holding in Moore –
that “[a] damage award in favor of Lady would effectively require boat
manufacturers to install propeller guards” on recreational boats. App. 36.
Such an outcome, the court held, “would frustrate the Coast Guard’s
decision that recreational boats should not be required to be equipped with
propeller guards.” App. 6.
Thus,
the decision below is manifestly at odds with the Texas Supreme Court’s
decision in Moore. In addition,
as the Fifth Circuit recognized, this split is reflected in numerous other
court decisions regarding the scope of preemption under the Boat Safety Act,
including Carstensen v. Brunswick Corp., 49 F.3d 430 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 516 U.S. 866 (1995), and Lewis v. Brunswick Corp., 107 F.3d
1494 (11th Cir. 1997), cert.
dismissed, 523 U.S. 1113 (1998).
See App. 6 (collecting cases).
Review is warranted here to finish the job started in Lewis: to resolve this split, prevent further
confusion among the lower courts, and ensure that state common law claims that
Congress intended to preserve are not preempted.
III. The
Decision Below Conflicts with Relevant Decisions of this Court.
Review
is also warranted because the lower court’s ruling conflicts with decisions of
this Court in at least three ways: first, it improperly affords preemptive
effect to federal regulatory inaction; second, it improperly abandons the
long-standing presumption against preemption; and, third, it fails to give any
– let alone sufficient – weight to the federal government’s own interpretation
of the preemptive effect of the Coast Guard’s decision not to regulate
propeller guards.
1.
The Lower Court
Erroneously Afforded Preemptive Effect to the Federal Government’s Regulatory
Inaction.
To begin with, the Fifth Circuit’s
holding that the Coast Guard’s decision not to commence rulemaking with
respect to propeller guards has preemptive force directly conflicts with Freightliner
Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280 (1995), which made clear that the mere
absence of federal regulation with respect to a particular product has no
preemptive effect whatsoever. In Myrick,
this Court considered whether a claim that a manufacturer was negligent for
failing to install antilock brakes in tractor‑trailer trucks was
preempted by the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, 15
U.S.C. §§ 1381 et seq. (1982), and by a federal motor vehicle
safety regulation governing airbrake systems in buses, trucks, and
trailers. 49 C.F.R. § 571.121 (S3)
(1993) (“Standard 121”).
As originally promulgated in 1974,
Standard 121 required that all truck manufacturers install antilock
brakes. This requirement was
invalidated by the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Paccar, Inc. v. NHTSA,
573 F.2d 632, 640 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 862 (1978), which
held that, although the braking performance of some trucks was improved by
antilock brakes, “critical problems began with mass production of vehicles
designed to meet the Standard.” Id.
at 641. Due to the unforeseen
manufacturing difficulties encountered during mass production of antilock
systems, the Ninth Circuit ordered the federal regulatory agency to suspend the
antilock requirements of Standard 121. Id.
at 643. In response, the agency added
language to the regulation stating that the antilock brake provisions
invalidated by the Paccar ruling “are not applicable to trucks and
trailers.” 49 C.F.R. § 571.121(S3).
In Myrick, the truck
manufacturers argued that Standard 121 preempted common law claims that their
trucks were defective because they lacked antilock brakes. This Court disagreed, holding that there
could be no express preemption because there was no federal standard in place
regarding antilock brakes in trucks. See
514 U.S. at 286. In so holding, Myrick
explicitly rejected the truck manufacturers’ claim “that the absence of
regulation itself constitutes regulation,” especially where “there is no
evidence that [the federal agency] decided that [the product] should be free
from all state regulation . . ..” Id. Regarding implied preemption, the Court ruled, first, that “it is
not impossible for petitioners to comply with both federal and state law
because there is simply no federal standard for a private party to comply
with.” Id. at 289.
Frustration of federal objectives was also not an issue, in the Court’s
view, because the federal regulation “currently has nothing to say concerning
[antilock brake] devices one way or another, and [the federal agency] has not
ordered truck manufacturers to refrain from using [such] devices. A finding of liability against petitioners
would undermine no federal objectives or purposes with respect to [antilock
brake] devices, since none exist.” Id.
at 289-90.
Myrick is squarely at odds with the decision below. In finding federal preemption of
petitioner’s no‑propeller-guard claim, the Fifth Circuit embraced the
very proposition that was rejected in Myrick: that an agency’s decision
not to regulate has the same preemptive force as a decision to regulate. This ruling has the perverse effect of
transforming a federal decision not to commence rulemaking regarding
propeller guards on motor boats into an affirmative decision to ban any
common law claim seeking to require a manufacturer to pay damages for failing
to include a specific propeller guard on a specific boat. Not only is this conclusion contrary to Myrick,
but it flies in the face of numerous prior decisions of this Court holding
that mere federal regulatory inaction, without more, does not imply an
authoritative federal determination that the area is best left
unregulated. See, e.g., Puerto Rico
Dep’t of Consumer Affairs v. Isla Petroleum Corp., 485 U.S. 496, 503‑04
(1988) (federal inaction alone does not have preemptive effect); Arkansas
Elec. Co‑Op v. Arkansas Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 461 U.S. 375, 384 (1983)
(regulatory inaction only has preemptive force where Congress has made clear
that its intention is “to fill a regulatory gap, not to perpetuate one.”)
(footnote omitted).
The lower court also ignored the
fact that, as in Myrick, “there is no evidence that [the federal agency]
decided that [the product at issue] should be free from all state regulation .
. ..” 514 U.S. at 286. As explained supra at 5-7, the Coast
Guard’s decision not to commence rulemaking regarding propeller guards stemmed
from its “many questions about whether a universally acceptable propeller guard
is available or technically feasible in all modes of boat operation.” App.
17. Due to the lack of a
“universally acceptable” solution, and the high statutory threshold of having
to demonstrate that federal regulation would “avoid a substantial risk of
personal injury to the public,” 46 U.S.C. § 4302(c)(2), the Coast Guard
declined to commence rulemaking to consider a nationwide standard for propeller
guards. Id. The agency never stated, however, that there
was no technology appropriate for use in any mode of boat
operation; rather, the Coast Guard found that there was no technology
appropriate for a national, across‑the‑board regulation
applicable to all types of boats.
Contrary to the Fifth Circuit’s apparent reasoning, this determination
would be entirely consistent with a state’s decision to allow some boat
manufacturers to be held liable for failing to install a certain type of
propeller guard on specific boats or on boats used for a particular purpose.
There is also no evidence that the
Coast Guard intended to restrict the ability of victims of propeller accidents
to seek compensation through the common law tort system. To the contrary, the record demonstrates
that the Coast Guard was well aware of the on‑going litigation regarding
propeller guards (see App. 13), yet the agency said nothing to suggest
that it intended to preempt such actions in the future. As the Texas Supreme Court found in Moore,
supra, the Propeller Subcommittee report that was the basis for the Coast
Guard’s decision not to regulate propeller guards “mentions that manufacturers
have been sued for not installing propeller guards, and recognizes that a
federal requirement of propeller guards would establish a prima facie case of
manufacturer liability in some states . . . Thus even if the Coast Guard made a
policy determination, carrying preemptive weight, that propeller guards should
not be regulated, its preemptive effect would not necessarily include common
law.” 889 S.W.2d at 252.
The absence of any preemptive
intent on the part of the Coast Guard is dramatically underscored by the manner
in which its decision was rendered.
Under the Boat Safety Act, the Coast Guard is directed to “prescribe
regulations . . . establishing minimum safety standards . . ..” 46 U.S.C. § 4302(a)(1) (emphasis
added). In keeping with this directive,
Congress clearly intended that only properly promulgated regulations would
exert preemptive force under the Act.
In this case, however, there was no rulemaking proceeding of any sort,
let alone a federal regulation proclaiming the Coast Guard’s intention to ban
state regulation of propeller guards.
Instead, the agency’s decision not to commence rulemaking was the
product of internal deliberations (as opposed to the notice‑and‑comment
rulemaking procedures mandated by the Administrative Procedure Act, see 5
U.S.C. § 553 (1994)), and was embodied in an informal letter to the Chairperson
of the Advisory Council setting forth the agency’s decision not to regulate
propeller guards. App. 16-17. This is hardly the type of “clear and
manifest” expression of preemptive purpose that must be evident before
preemption may be found based on regulatory inaction. Isla Petroleum,
485 U.S. at 503.
At bottom, the Coast Guard’s
decision not to commence rulemaking with regard to propeller guards is markedly
similar to the fate of antilock brake regulation described in Myrick. In both cases, the absence of regulation was
due to a determination that the current state of technology did not warrant a
universal regulatory solution to a safety problem. In Myrick, that decision was made by the Ninth Circuit and
then memorialized in the amendment to Standard 121 eliminating the antilock
brake requirement for trucks and trailers; in this case, the decision not to
commence rulemaking was made by the agency in the first instance. But the result in both instances was the
same: an absence of any federal
regulation mandating or prohibiting the use of the technology in
question. Myrick makes clear
that federal preemption does not exist under these circumstances.
The Fifth Circuit’s decision,
moreover, has implications far beyond the narrow issue of preemption under the
Boat Safety Act. If the decision below
is permitted to stand, it could massively broaden the scope of federal
preemption far beyond what Congress ever intended. Under the lower court’s reasoning, any federal decision
not to regulate could be deemed to have preemptive force, regardless of the
reason for federal inaction and regardless of the extent to which Congress made
clear its intent not to intrude on States’ regulatory power and/or strip
individuals of their common law remedies.
Not only would this constitute a grievous blow against the traditional
rights of victims to seek redress for injuries caused by dangerous products,
but it would strip the States of their historic power to protect the health and
welfare of their citizens. Review is
warranted to prevent this deep encroachment on the rights of the States to
protect their citizens and of citizens to use the common law to protect
themselves – rights that neither Congress nor the Coast Guard ever expressed
any intention to restrict.
2.
The Lower Court
Erroneously Disregarded the Presumption Against Preemption.
Review is also warranted to
correct the lower court’s decision to abandon any presumption against
preemption of common law claims in all cases in the “maritime” context – even
those involving a small recreational boat in state waters. See App. 38 (“we conclude that, at
least in the instant maritime context, where the federal interest and presence
has traditionally been so significant and there is no presumption against
preemption, implied preemption precludes Lady’s actions against OMC.”) This approach does violence to the rights of
the States to provide compensation for their citizens and flies in the face of
long-standing decisions of this Court recognizing a strong presumption against
federal preemption in health and safety matters. See generally Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 485.
The Fifth Circuit’s error stemmed
from a misreading of this Court’s recent decision in Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 120 S. Ct.1135 (2000), which involved
state regulations of the operation and design of ocean-going oil tankers used
in international commerce. Locke
merely held that, in a case where “[t]he state laws in question bear upon
national and international maritime commerce, . . . there is no
beginning assumption that concurrent regulation by the State is a valid
exercise of its police powers.” Id. at
1148 (emphasis added). A presumption
against preemption is inappropriate in such cases, this Court reasoned, given
Congress’ longstanding authority “to regulate interstate navigation, without
embarrassment from intervention of the separate States and resulting
difficulties with foreign nations.” Id.
at 1143. The Court also expressed
concern that regulations governing international ocean-going oil tankers
implicated “the substantial foreign affairs interests of the Federal
Government.” Id. at 1142.
These concerns have no bearing
here. First, this case is entirely
unrelated to “interstate navigation,” as the accident that harmed petitioner
occurred on Mississippi waters. Second,
this case has nothing to do with “maritime commerce,” international or
otherwise, as the Boat Safety Act merely involves federal regulation of recreational
vessels, such as the speed boat that struck petitioner. See 46 U.S.C. § 4301. Finally, the United States’ “foreign affairs
interests” – so paramount in Locke that “the governments of 13
ocean-going nations expressed their concerns [about conflicting state
regulations] through a diplomatic note” (120 S. Ct. at 1142) – are
clearly not implicated here. The United
States has no greater interest in maintaining presumptively exclusive authority
over safety features on small recreational boats than it has in other areas,
such as medical devices, cigarettes, and myriad other spheres where the federal
government has regulatory authority and yet the presumption against preemption
has been applied by this Court with full force. See, e.g., Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 485 (medical devices); Cipollone
v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S.
504, 516 (1992) (cigarettes).
At the same time, Locke reaffirmed
that the “beginning assumption” against preemption continues to apply in cases
involving the “historic police powers of the States.” 120 S. Ct. at 1147 (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp.,
331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)). Numerous
prior decisions of this Court have made clear that such powers may be exercised
concurrently with the federal government’s jurisdiction over maritime matters, see,
e.g., Askew v. American Waterways Operators, 411 U.S. 325 (1973); Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit,
362 U.S. 440 (1960); Kelly v. State of Washington, 302 U.S. 1, 10
(1937), and that, absent express Congressional intent to preempt the entire
field of state law, preemption only lies where the conflict between state and
federal law is “so ‘direct and positive’ that the two acts cannot ‘be
reconciled or consistently stand together.’” Kelly, 302 U.S. at 10
(citations omitted). See also Askew,
411 U.S. at 341; Huron, 362 U.S. at 444. Nothing in Locke suggests that these cases are no longer
good law, or that the presumption against preemption no longer applies in cases
– such as this one – that involve the historic police powers of the states to
compensate accident victims through the tort system. See, e.g., Medtronic, 518 U.S. at
488. Review is warranted to correct the
Fifth Circuit’s unprecedented holding to the contrary.
3.
The Lower Court
Erroneously Disregarded the United States’ Own Interpretation of the Preemptive
Effect of the Coast Guard’s Regulatory Inaction.
Finally, review is warranted
because the Fifth Circuit improperly disregarded this Court’s repeated
teachings that the views of the federal government are entitled to deference
when determining the preemptive effect of an agency’s regulatory decisions. As this Court held in Medtronic, the
United States’ interpretation of the scope of preemption is entitled to
“substantial weight.” 518 U.S. at 496
(majority opinion); id. at 505-07 (Breyer, J., concurring). See also Geier v. Honda, 529
U.S. 1913, 120 S. Ct. 1913, 1928 (1999)
(federal government’s interpretation of preemptive scope of agency regulations
is entitled to “special weight”); Hillsborough County, 471 U.S. at 714-15 (“[t]he [federal government’s]
statement is dispositive on the question of implicit intent to pre-empt unless
either the agency’s position is inconsistent with clearly expressed
congressional intent, . . . or subsequent developments reveal a change in that
position”) (citations omitted).
Deference to the federal government’s understanding of the Boat Safety
Act is particularly appropriate where, as here, the United States is ceding
authority to the states, not trying to claim power for itself. The concern behind the preemption doctrine –
protection of federal interests from inconsistent state or local activity – is
not implicated where the United States itself does not object to – and indeed
welcomes – state participation. See
Hillsborough County, 471 U.S. at 714-15.
The Fifth Circuit paid lip service
to these principles, but then substituted its judgment for that of the United
States in holding that petitioner’s common law claims are impliedly preempted
by federal law. Such an approach was
warranted, in the lower court’s view, because the United States had not entered
an appearance before it – even though the federal government’s brief in Lewis
was made part of the record in this proceeding and even though the Fifth
Circuit itself recognized the implied preemption question as a “close and
difficult issue.” App. 6. Review is warranted to ensure that the lower
courts are not left free to disregard the federal government’s own view on the
preemptive scope of agency decisions.
CONCLUSION
This petition for a writ of certiorari
should be granted.
Respectfully submitted,
Carter O. Bise
Logan & Bise
2211 24th Avenue
P.O. Drawer 4207
Gulfport, MS 39502-4207
228/864-3666
Arthur Bryant
Trial Lawyers for Public
Justice, P.C.
One Kaiser Plaza, Suite 275
Oakland, CA 94612-3684
510/622-8150
Leslie A. Brueckner
(Counsel of Record)
Anne Bloom
Trial Lawyers for Public
Justice , P.C.
1717 Massachusetts Avenue, NW, Suite 800
Washington, D.C. 20036
202/797-8600
Counsel for Petitioners
Date:
December 22, 2000
[1] The Coast Guard has, however, continued to study
various policy proposals to prevent propeller-related injuries. App. 17-18 n.12. In 1995, for example, the Coast Guard issued an Advance Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking (“ANPRM”) requesting comment on “the public’s present
feelings about the use of propeller guards on these vessels,” a request
occasioned by a serious accident involving a houseboat. See 60 Fed. Reg. 25,191 (1995). In 1996, the Coast Guard issued another
ANPRM “to gather current, specific, and accurate information about the injuries
involving propeller strikes and rented boats.”
61 Fed. Reg. 12,123 (1996). And,
in 1997, the Coast Guard sought “comments on the effectiveness and
interventions which have been suggested for reducing the number of recreational
boating accidents involving rented power boats in which individuals are injured
by the propeller.” 62 Fed. Reg. 22,991
(1997). Because it received few
responses to that request, the Coast Guard extended the period for
comments. See 62 Fed. Reg.
44,507 (1997). To date, the rulemaking
is still open, and the Coast Guard is still considering what action, if any, to
take with regard to propeller guards. See
64 Fed. Reg. 21,566 (1999).